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Abstract
We generate observable expectations about fiscal variables through
laboratory experiments using real world data from several European
countries as stimuli. We compare a VAR model of expectations for
data which is presented in a fiscal frame with one for neutrally pre-
sented data. We measure the degree to which participants use fiscal
data for their forecasts. Agents’ expectations are found neither to be
consistent with rational nor with purely adaptive expectations but,
instead, follow an augmented-adaptive scheme. Methodological im-
plications of the present approach for experiments in macroeconomics
are also discussed.
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1 Introduction
Expectations on fiscal variables are crucial to understand the effect of fiscal
policy on the private sector. Little is however known on the actual way
people form expectations on fiscal variables. While many models are based
on the hypothesis of rational expectations, empirical evidence is limited and
indirect; this is partly due to the unobservability of expectations.
The standard approach is to empirically investigate predicted relations
between observable variables, like relationships between fiscal variables and
components of output, and from there to infer the effect which unobservables
might have played. Examples of this approach range from classical tests of
the Ricardian equivalence (see Seater, 1993, for a review), to more recent
analyses of the so called ‘anti-Keynesian’ (i.e. expansionary) effects of fiscal
adjustments (Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000).
A problem in this approach, however, is that the identification of the
effects of expectations is model-dependent, and model comparison is very
hard. Moreover many unobserved correlated factors are typically at play in
data collected from real economies. This makes identification of the effects of
expectations quite difficult, because “economists cannot observe all the data
that economic agents do” (Seater, 1993, p. 164).
The latter limitation is also relevant for expectation measures derived
from opinion surveys1. Moreover surveys suffer from lack of economic incen-
tives to reveal true opinions, so that for various reasons respondents “may
express judgements that are different from the ones they choose to act upon”
(Pesaran, 1987, p. 209).
A third approach is to measure expectations in a controlled experiment.
Expectations experiments have been conducted since as early as the sixties
in a wide range of economic contexts. They have looked at price expecta-
tions (Fisher, 1962 and Schmalensee, 1977), expectations about artificially
constructed time series (Hey, 1994), expectations on monetary policies (e.g.
Marimon and Sunder, 1993, and Bernasconi and Kirchkamp, 2000), or even
fiscal policy (Swenson, 1997).
While the experimental approach allows to implement the ceteris paribus
condition as none of the other two (and correct for the lack of incentives of
the survey approach), it typically suffers from the critique that the stimuli are
given in situations that are far from the real economic world, thus questioning
the validity of the connection between the lab and the real economy.
In this paper, we study the process of forming expectations on fiscal
1For example, surveys conducted by Grun (1991) and Allers, de Haan, and de Kam
(1998) found widespread evidence of misinformation on the conduct of government fiscal
policy.
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policy. We combine field and lab data to control information that subjects
observe, while still giving them data taken from the real world 2.
The approach innovates on existing literature in various respects. We list
here few areas in which the paper gives original contributions.
First of all, stimuli are represented by annual time series of fiscal vari-
ables from 15 OECD countries. Unlike in previous experiments, they refer
to bivariate, not univariate, times series, namely taxes and public expendi-
tures. This allows us to include a richer set of models in our comparison
and to extend the analysis to augmented adaptive models. Stimuli are given
sequentially. We recorded 1581 different time series of realized expectations.
We check the internal validity of the experimental set-up by way of a
control group of participants who form expectations without knowing the
fiscal origin of the times series and we discuss the extent of the external
validity of the experiment.
Given the type of stimuli-response data of this experiment, we need new
techniques to model both parts of the data. We develop a modeling strat-
egy which is consistent both with current practice in macro-econometrics
and micro-econometrics. We assume that the joint data generating process
(DGP) of stimuli and expectations data is a VAR; we next show how natural
assumptions arising from the experimental design imply specific restrictions.
Two subsystems are derived, one for the field data and one for the agents’
expectations; we then discuss various possible econometric relationships be-
tween the subsystems. Various econometric results in the area are collected
and we show how to analyse the field data first and subsequently the expec-
tation data. The analysis allows for non-stationary behaviour both of field
and expectation variables.
Many macroeconomic investigations use cointegration techniques and
Granger causality tests to investigate the sustainability of fiscal policy
and the type of causality between taxes and public expenditure (see, e.g.,
Trehan and Walsh, 1991 and Ahmed and Rogers, 1995, as classical refer-
ences; Garcia and Henin, 1999, as a more recent example); the present two
stage approach contains this analysis as the first step.
The approach encompasses many micro-models for the formation of ex-
pectations in the second step. We find that a major component of the process
depends on past forecast errors. Generally subjects fail to perceive the fiscal
properties which we estimate in the field.
The evidence neither supports the ‘rational expectation hypothesis’, nor
a purely adaptive scheme; rather, expectations fall within a class of so called
2The experiments of Fisher (1962) and Schmalensee (1977) used real price data, though
the focus there was on purely statistical, rather than economic meaning of data.
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‘augmented-adaptive models’, introduced in the early eighties by various au-
thors, see Pesaran (1987). These models then become the starting point for
a growing literature of ‘bounded rationality’ (Sargent, 1993) and ‘adaptive
learning’ in self referential economies (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, for
a comprehensive survey).
The VAR approach we take to analyse the data excludes non-linear be-
haviour in the DGP. This may be disputable, since discretionary interventions
and exogenous shifts may introduce non linearities in fiscal policy (as for ex-
ample documented for the US by Bohn, 1998, and Sarno, 2001). The latter
case is of interest since it may also generate specific anti-Keynesian effects of
fiscal policy (see e.g. the models surveyed in Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano,
2000, and the empirical investigation conducted therein).
We test for nonlinearity and find that the VAR specification is robust
against it.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the
experiment and dicusses issues of internal and external validity. Section 3
develops the econometric approach to analyse both the stimulus and the ex-
pectations data. Section 4 discusses the empirical specification of the field
and lab models. Inference results are presented in Section 5. The last sec-
tion summarises and discusses the implications of the present approach for
experiments in macroeconomics.
2 Experimental setup
The experiment has a time-structure, t = 1, . . . , n; the setup nests a simple
(two-periods) representative agent small economy. Participants are exposed
to graphical representations of time series of fiscal variables, taken from vari-
ous European countries. The stimuli refer to gross total taxes Tt, total public
expenditure (inclusive of interest payments) Gt, public debt Bt, and change
in the debt level ∆Bt = Bt −Bt−1 at time t, all expressed as yearly percent-
age of GDP. Here and in the following ∆ is the time difference. In this paper
we focus on the relationship and the direction of perceived causality between
taxes and expenditure, namely vector xt := (Tt, Gt).
Agents do not know which country and which period the series refer to.
Utility in the experiment is derived from consumption over two subsequent
periods:
ut =
t+1∏
i=t
γCi + (1− γ)Gi with γ = 0.75 (1)
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subject to the budget constraint
t+1∑
i=t
(1− Ci − Ti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
savings
· (1 + r)i−t = 0 with r = 0.1 . (2)
Agents receive initial information on the first seven values of stimuli; for most
countries the first available year was 1970. Let t−1 be the last available year
and Xt−1 := (x1, . . . , xt−1)
′ the available information; for each subsequent
year t agents forecast taxes and/or public expenditure.
Three experimental treatments were performed: in one of the treatments
participants forecast both Tt and Gt (see figure 1), in a second treatment
participants forecast Tt only (see figure 2). The third treatment is a control
treatment that is designed similarly to the first (Tt and Gt) treatment. The
only difference is that participants are not informed about the economic
content of the variables. Variables are simply called A, B, and C (see figure
3). Everything else is as in the original Tt and Gt treatment. We call this
treatment the ‘neutral’ treatment. Agents express forecasts clicking with the
mouse directly into the diagrams. Instructions can be found in appendix
B. Forecasts are indicated as T Eit and G
Ei
t , where i indicates agent i and E
stands for expectation. Let yi,t indicate all the forecast of agent i that refer
to time t; in the Tt and Gt treatment yi,t := (T
Ei
t , G
Ei
t )
′ while yi,t := T
Ei
t in
the Tt only treatment.
The time series of the stimuli are updated recursively in each period after
forecasts are made, so that subjects learn about realization of the stimuli as
the economy moves on. More specifically, given subjects’ forecasts yi,t for year
t, the computer determines an optimal consumption level Ct−1 for the current
period given eq. (1) and (2). In period t, xt := (Tt, Gt)
′ become available and
are communicated to the participant. The computer uses equation (2) to
determine Ct and then uses equation (1) to calculate the participant’s utility
for period t− 1. The participant’s per minute wage is
w = 0.66 · (ut/u
∗
t )
η where η =
{
12000 in the Tt and Gt treatment
15000 in the Tt only treatment
(3)
where u∗t is the utility the participant would obtain with forecasting the
true values. This transformation from utilities into wages is monotonic and,
hence, does not affect the maximisation problem of the individual. The
transformation, however, creates steeper incentives to make good forecasts.
Participants are payed this wage up to two minutes for each forecast. If a
participant needs more time to complete a forecast only the first two minutes
are paid3.
3We have introduced this payment scheme to simultaneously encourage participants to
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number of participants
Country Sample period Tt and Gt Tt only neutral
Austria 1970-1998 34 14 28
Belgium 1970-1998 52 20 48
Denmark 1971-1995 43 14 43
Finland 1970-1998 33 12 24
France 1977-1998 29 10 31
Germany 1970-1998 14 13 5
Greece 1975-1998 26 13 22
Ireland 1970-1995 45 21 44
Italy 1970-1998 35 16 29
Netherlands 1970-1998 32 9 23
Norway 1970-1998 32 14 26
Portugal 1970-1998 25 13 23
Spain 1970-1998 30 11 24
Sweden 1970-1998 53 16 41
United Kingdom 1970-1995 27 15 19
non-economists (54) 23 5 26
economists (116) 53 20 43
Total (170) 76 25 69
Table 1: Summary of the experimental treatments
Since participants made forecasts for more than one country the total number is not the
sum of the number of participants in all countries.
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Figure 1: Tt and Gt treatment
Different agents participated in the three treatments. 76 took part in the
Tt and Gt treatment, 25 in the Tt only treatment, and 69 in the neutral treat-
ment. Of these participants 116 were students in economics or business (we
will call them economists), 54 were from a different field (natural sciences,
languages, law, and social sciences; we will call them non-economists). Each
agent made predictions for several countries within each treatment. Stim-
ulus data were from 15 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden and UK4. Table 1 summarises the parameters of the
treatments with the number of participants in the various conditions. For
the majority of countries the sample period of stimulus data was 1970-98;
few exceptions (Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland and UK) are due to lim-
its in the availability of the fiscal time series. For all countries, expectations
recording started from the seventh year of the stimulus (which was then 1977
for most countries). A representation of the stimulus data for the different
countries is shown in figure 4 and figure 5.
think about their forecasts, but also to remain active.
4All stimulus data used in the experiment were taken from the OECD (2000) database
“Fiscal Positions and Business Cycle”.
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Figure 2: Tt only treatment
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Figure 3: neutral treatment
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Figure 4: Stimulus data (as G over T )
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The experiment were carried out in the experimental laboratory of the
SFB 504 in Mannheim between November 2000 and December 2002. Ex-
perimental sessions were conducted individually. All 170 participants spent
about 2 hours in the laboratory. They made, on average, 136 forecasts (be-
tween 28 and 309), and completed on average one forecast every 39 seconds.
Instructions given to participants are reported in appendix B.
2.1 Internal validity
Can we trust our setup? Are participants understanding and are they using
the economic context, or are they simply extrapolating the data without
economic consideration. To answer this question we compare the Tt and Gt
treatment with the neutral treatment. If participants understand and make
use of the economic context we should expect that forecasts are better in the
fiscal frame than in the neutral frame. Furthermore, if special economic skills
are necessary to make forecasts we should expect that participants from the
economists group make better forecasts than the non-economists.
In figure 6 we show the cumulative distribution of the mean squared
error of the forecasts for tax revenue. The solid line shows the distribution
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Figure 6: Forecast errors in the fiscal and neutral treatments
for economists in the fiscal frame. The dashed line shows the distribution for
economists in the neutral frame. Indeed, mean squared errors of forecasts
are smaller in the fiscal frame than in the neutral frame, i.e. participants in
the experiments seem to be able to make use of the economic context of the
information. The dotted line shows the distribution for non-economists in
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the fiscal frame. Again their forecast errors are smaller than the errors of
non-economists in the neutral frame (dashed-and-dotted line). While there
is a stark difference between the fiscal frame and the neutral frame there is
no obvious difference between the economists and the non-economists.
To test this more formally we explain the mean squared errors as a func-
tion of a dummy de that is one for economists and zero otherwise, and a
dummy dn that is one in the neutral treatment and zero otherwise.
(T − T E)2 = βTe de + β
T
n dn + c +  (4)
(G−GE)2 = βGe de + β
G
n dn + c +  (5)
Results of the robust regression that treats each participant as an indepen-
dent observation are shown in table 2. In both equations we have βn positive
and significantly different from zero. βe is not significantly different from
zero.
estimation of equation 4 (145 independent observations)
(T − T E)2 β σ t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βn .5586159 .2216946 2.52 0.013 .12042 .9968119
βe −.0226633 .2255656 −0.10 0.920 −.4685105 .423184
c 2.791348 .1996356 13.98 0.000 2.396754 3.185943
estimation of equation 5 (145 independent observations)
(G−GE)2 β σ t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βn 1.071765 .4808198 2.23 0.027 .1213885 2.022141
βe .0039117 .5156949 0.01 0.994 −1.015398 1.023221
c 6.366691 .5207256 12.23 0.000 5.337437 7.395944
Table 2: Test for internal validity
All standard deviations are calculated using a robust regression method taking into account
correlations of observations for each participant.
Given that βn is significant and positive in both equations we conclude
that we have obtained internal validity in our experiment. We also see that
students from economics and related fields do not have a significant advantage
in the experiment.
2.2 External validity
It is unlikely that consumers form expectations on fiscal policy only on the
basis of spending and taxes. Expectations might be affected by the composi-
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tion of the government, the date of the next election, economic development,
foreign policy, natural disasters, to name only a few. Why are we neglecting
all these factors?
Indeed, neglecting these factors and concentrating only on a few would be
more problematic if our expectations were formed in the field and not in the
lab. In the field we would not know whether a change in expectations is due
to a change in the fiscal policy or due to some other factor. Isolating all these
factors in the field can be a very hard task, a task that can be simplified in the
laboratory. It is a strength, not a weakness, of laboratory experiments that
we can concentrate on a small number of factors. In this paper we look only
at taxation and government expenditure. We do not tell participants about
political parties, elections, etc., to make sure that their expectations can not
be tainted by these variables. Changes in our participants’ expectations can
in the lab only be the result of the information we provide them.
Putting our participants in such a simple world means that they may
not form particularly precise expectations. This, however, is not a problem,
since we are not interested in a comparison of the expectation and the real-
isation. What we want to know is how the expectation process works and
how past fiscal variables affect expectations. For this reason, past values of
fiscal variables are the only information available in the experiment.
A vast empirical literature on fiscal policy also use the time series we pro-
vide to subjects in the experiment, to analyse the fiscal conduct of countries
and to derive judgements regarding the sustainability of their fiscal policies
and the direction of causality between fiscal variables. In the remaining
body of the paper, we develop an empirical model of stimuli and of expecta-
tion data, which coherently ties the present experiment to such econometric
practice. Through it we discuss the meaning and implication of general ex-
pectation schemes (rational, adaptive, augmented adaptive), consider and
estimate properties of field data and check how these features are perceived
by subjects in the experiment.
3 A VAR model for the experiment
This section discusses the joint modelling of the stimuli and of expectation
data. In order to simplify the analysis we specify a model on each single coun-
try separately. This choice corresponds to a limited information context in
simultaneous systems of equations. In a complete system, i.e. one containing
all country-specific subsystems, one could envisage several effects (variance
components) associated with each individual, which are now discarded in the
analysis.
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While the limited information context leaves room for improvement in ef-
ficiency for estimation and testing, it delivers more robust inference, i.e. con-
sistent estimates even under misspecification of some other country specific
subsystem. This appears highly desirable.
Each individual i provides forecasts yi,t on the basis of the knowledge of
the history of stimuli Xt−1 := (x1, . . . , xt−1)
′, where xt = (Tt, Gt)
′. Let m in-
dicate the number of individuals, i = 1, . . . , m. Recall that yi,t = (T
Ei
t , G
Ei
t )
′
in the Tt and Gt treatment and yi,t = T
Ei
t in the Tt only treatment. Let
zi,t := (y
′
i,t, x
′
t)
′ be the data vector involved in the prediction for agent
i at time t. Let Zi,t−1 indicate the history of z
j
i,s up to time t − 1,
Zi,t−1 := (zi,1, . . . , zi,t−1)
′, which represents the relevant information set avail-
able to individual i in the expectation formation for the next period.
Consider also the vector wt := (y
′
t, x
′
t)
′ := (y′1,t, y
′
2,t . . . y
′
m,t, x
′
t)
′ contain-
ing all predictions performed by all agents at time t − 1 along with the
variables to be predicted. The prediction variables are grouped in the vec-
tor yt := (y
′
1,t, y
′
2,t. . . .,y
′
m,t)
′. Let also Wt−1 := (w
′
1, . . . , w
′
t−1)
′ indicate the
complete history of stimuli and predictions of all agents. We next state re-
strictions on the DGP of the joint process {wt}
∞
t=1 that are consistent with
the experimental setup.
3.1 Assumptions
Given the sequential structure of the experiment, we decompose the
probability measure of the stochastic process {wt}
∞
t=1 sequentially, as in
Engle, Hendry, and Richard (1983), into the product of L(wt|Wt−1). Here
and in the following L(·|Wt−1) indicates conditional probability given Wt−1.
This allows to define the DGP of the process by its transition probabilities.
We assume that the DGP for wt can be taken to be a Vector Autoregres-
sive process (VAR), A(L)wt = µ+ t where t are i.i.d. N(0, Ω) across t and
A(L) =
∑k
`=0 A`L
` is the autoregressive polynomial in the lag operator L,
A0 := I, the identity matrix. This assumption is summarised as follows.
Assumption 1 The law of wt conditional on Wt−1, L(wt|Wt−1) is Gaussian
with moments
E(∆wt|Wt−1) = µ + Πwt−1 +
k−1∑
`=0
Γ`∆wt−` V (wt|Wt−1) = Ω.
where Π := −A(1), Γ` := −
∑k
i=`+1 Ai, and µ is a vector of constants.
Several remarks are in order here. First of all, assumption 1 states that
the DGP of the variables observed in the field xt is nested within a VAR
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assumption for wt. It should be noted that this excludes non-linear behaviour
in xt, which (as anticipated in the introduction) is viewed as disputable
by some (see e.g., Bohn, 1998, Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000, and
references therein). We consider the issue of nonlinearity in some details in
Section 5.3.
The assumption of normality may appear also restrictive. It is adopted
here for convenience and can be dropped when one resorts to time-
asymptotics. We note, however, that for moderate temporal sample size
this assumption is hard to test and reject.
Mostly important, we emphasise that most panel data models do not
start with a VAR as a reference model, but rather directly from a collection
of single equations, one of each individual. This is not advisable in the present
context, for various reasons. Firstly, wt contains the stimuli, which are likely
to have obvious interactions. As suggested above, the econometric analysis
of the stimuli is just as important as the one of the responses, and hence a
multivariate approach for the modelling of xt is mandatory. Moreover, the
present VAR approach allows to view the links between the information set
Zi,t−1 and the prediction yi,t directly as parameters of the joint model and it
includes the univariate standard regression model as a special case.
Obviously, starting with a VAR as reference model, while very general,
leaves room for too many parameters; in the present case, it also permits
variables in the field to be influenced by data in the experiment, an issue
which we address in the next assumption.
Assumption 2 The DGP of the stimuli xt conditional on Wt−1 does
not depend on past prediction variables ys for any s = 1, . . . t − 1,
i.e. L(∆xt|Wt−1) = L(∆xt|Xt−1).
Under assumption 2, yt does not Granger-cause xt (see e.g.
Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983). This assumption makes sense in
this experimental setting, where the stimuli were generated by natural
experiments well before the lab experiment was performed.
In the following, blocks of the Π, Γ` and Ω matrices corresponding to
the various components of wt are indicated with the subscripts 1, . . . , m, x
conformably with wt := (y
′
1,t, y
′
2,t . . . , y
′
m,t, x
′
t)
′. In the following the subscript
y is used to group the first m blocks of prediction variables together: Γ`,1x is
e.g. the block of coefficients of xt−` in the expression for E(∆y1,t|Wt−1), while
Πxy is the block of coefficients of (∆y
′
1,t−1, . . .∆y
′
m,t−1)
′ in the expression for
E(∆xt|Wt−1)
5.
5Note that the conditional expectation operator E(·|Wt−1) and the prediction per-
formed by the agents do not necessarily coincide.
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Under Assumption 1, it is well known that Assumption 2 holds if and only
if Πxy = 0 and Γ`,xy = 0 for all ` = 1, .., k− 1. This translates Assumption 2
into a parametric restriction, which is later exploited in model specification.
We next wish to incorporate information on the relation among the pre-
diction variables yi,t across agents. Given the experimental setup, it is natu-
ral to assume that forecasts are independent across agents, given the public
information available.
Assumption 3 Let j be different from i;
a) the DGP of the forecast L(∆yi,t|Wt−1) does not depend on the forecast
made by other agents, i.e. on yj,s for any time in the past s = 1, . . . t− 1.
b) Moreover ∆yi,t and ∆yj,t are independent conditionally on Wt−1.
This assumption formalises the experimental setup where individual forecasts
are performed independently of each other. Under Assumption 1, observe
that Assumption 3a holds if and only if Πyy = diag(Π11, . . . , Πmm), Γ`,yy =
diag(Γ`,11, . . . , Γ`,mm) for all ` = 1, .., k−1; while Assumption 3b holds if and
only if Ωyy = diag(Ω11, . . . , Ωmm). Again this translates Assumption 3 into
parametric restrictions, which are later exploited in model specification.
The structure implied by the three Assumptions above can be used to
derive two sub-systems, a field system for the stimuli xt, and a lab system
for the prediction variables yt. This is done in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Let Assumption 1 and 2 hold; then
• the field sub-system DGP for xt, L(∆xt|Wt−1) = L(∆xt|Xt−1), is Gaus-
sian with variance matrix Ωxx and mean
E(∆xt|Xt−1) = µx + Πxxxt−1 +
k−1∑
`=1
Γ`,xx∆xt−`. (6)
• If moreover Assumption 3 holds, the lab sub-system DGP for yt given
the past, L(∆yt|Wt−1), is Gaussian with independent components,
i.e. L(∆yt|Wt−1) can be decomposed in the product of L(∆yi,t|Wt−1)
for i = 1, . . . , m, where L(∆yi,t|Wt−1) = L(∆yi,t|Zi,t−1) is Gaussian
with variance Ωii and conditional mean
E(∆yi,t|Wt−1) = E(∆yi,t|Zi,t−1) =
= µi + (Πii : Πix)zi,t−1 +
k−1∑
`=1
(Γ`,ii : Γ`,ix)∆zi,t−`.(7)
and Ωyy = diag(Ω11, . . . , Ωmm). Recall that zi,t := (y
′
i,t, x
′
t)
′.
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Proof. The results hold by standard properties of the Gaussian distribu-
tion.
The Proposition clarifies that the model nests a marginal VAR for xt,
which will be the basis for the analysis of stimuli data. Moreover, yt is a
VARX where the stimuli xt act as exogenous variables.
Two important issues here concern the process of expectations forming
and the properties of fiscal variables, namely cointegration and causality, as
occurring in the field and as perceived in the lab. These are analysed in the
following subsections.
3.2 Expectation schemes
The restricted VAR discussed in the previous section has implications re-
garding the formation of expectations. In this section we illustrate rational,
adaptive and augmented-adaptive expectations within the present context.
We start from rational expectations. The optimisation problem given
trough equations (1) and (2) implies a quadratic loss function. For a
quadratic loss function and a given information set the optimal predictor is
given by conditional expectations (Muth, 1961). Expectations are called ra-
tional if they coincide with the ones formed under the DGP (see e.g. Pesaran,
1987). One can then calculate rational expectations by computing the con-
ditional expectations of xt given the relevant information set.
The implied specific form of rational expectations is repeated in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 5 (Rational expectations) Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold;
the rational expectation on ∆xt given any of the information sets Xt−1, Wt−1,
Zit−1 is given by
g(Xt−1) := E(∆xt|Wt−1) = E(∆xt|Xt−1) = E(∆xt+1|Zi,t−1) =
µx + Πxxxt−1 +
k−1∑
`=1
Γ`,xx∆xt−`.
Proof. Under Assumption 2, the information contained in Wt−1 or Zi,t−1
in excess of the past history of x (Xt−1) is irrelevant, so that the various
conditional expectations coincide. The marginal DGP for xt is Gaussian
with the above conditional expectations (see eq. (6) in Proposition 4).
Let a superscript 1 indicate the first component of a vector; y1i,t, the first
component in yi,t, is a representative expectation variable, and assume that
y1i,t represents a forecast of x
1
t , the first component in xt. The form of the
rational expectations on proposition 5 provides the yardstick to measure the
16
degree of rationality present in actual forecasts. In particular, for rational
expectations to hold one expects to find E(∆y1i,t|Zi,t−1) = g
1(Xt−1), i.e. that
the observed expectations are rational on average. If observed expectations
were exactly rational one would expect ∆yi,t = g(Xt−1) almost surely; we
here allow for some idiosyncratic error in the observed expectations, and
take E(∆y1i,t|Zi,t−1) = g
1(Xt−1) as a test of rational expectations. Deviations
from this equality are taken as departure from rationality of expectations.
One alternative formation process of expectations is the adaptive scheme,
as originated in the 1950s by the works of Cagan (1956), Friedman (1957)
and Nerlove (1958). We employ here the following definition.
Definition 6 (Adaptive expectations) An adaptive scheme is any bi-
variate transfer function of the form
E(∆y1i,t|Zi,t−1) = a(L)y
1
i,t−1 + b(L)x
1
t + c
where a(L) and b(L) are finite scalar polynomials of the lag operator L, and
c is a constant.
We emphasise the bivariate nature of the adaptive scheme6: in particular,
under adaptive expectations, one would expect that only past values of the
forecasted variable x1t and of its forecast y
1
i,t enter in the expectation process
for y1i,t. In most of the previous experiments studying expectation forma-
tion, subjects had to forecast a univariate time series (as for example in
Schmalensee, 1977 or Hey, 1994). They generally found support for adaptive
expectations (though not necessarily of the first order, e.g Hey, 1994). In
the present experiment, if other variables enter in the estimated equation for
∆y1i,t, this is evidence against a purely adaptive scheme and in favour of a
more general class of models known as augmented-adaptive (Pesaran, 1987).
Definition 7 (Augmented-adaptive expectations) An augmented-
adaptive scheme is any multivariate transfer function of the form
E(∆y1i,t|Zi,t−1) = C(L)zi,t−1 + c
where C(L) :=
∑p
`=1 C`L
` is a finite order matrix polynomial of the lag op-
erator L, and c is a constant, zi,t := (y
′
i,t, x
′
t)
′.
Augmented-adaptive schemes are interesting because they nest both rational
and simple adaptive schemes; therefore they offer the natural setting to test
for both types of expectations processes.
6See Pesaran (1987) for many variations nested within this general definition.
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They are also sometimes referred to as ‘boundedly rational’ learning mod-
els (Sargent, 1993). In particular, they emphasise the use that an important
stream of literature makes of these schemes to study the actual transition
dynamics of economies driven by the way people form expectations, like
for example in the classical cobweb economy or in the more recent liter-
ature on general equilibrium self-referential economy (as e.g. reviewed in
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). A question of interest in the latter context
is whether ‘boundedly rational’ learning models can bring convergence to
rational expectations equilibria, as also studied experimentally in various in-
vestigations 7. In the partial equilibrium approach of the present experiment,
the question of convergence is clearly of a lesser interest.
The next section discusses cointegration and causality restrictions on the
subsystems (6), (7).
3.3 Properties of data: cointegration and causality
In the following, we enquire the possibility of cointegration (CI) in the vector
wt under Assumptions 1 and 2, and state the expected long run properties
of stimuli and predictions. The integration properties of the series do not
interfere with the analysis of the degree of rationality of expectations, but
rather offer additional opportunities in the study of expectation formation.
The following proposition states CI restrictions, and focuses on the Equi-
librium Correction Mechanisms (ECM) (see Hendry, 1995) of the two sub-
systems.
Proposition 8 Let wt be at most I(1) with CI rank equal to r; this im-
plies Π = αβ ′, with α and β full column rank matrices with rank r. Under
Assumptions 1, 2, the CI space β and the adjustment coefficients α can be
represented as follows
αβ ′ =
(
αy1
0
)
β ′1w + αw2
(
0 β ′2x
)
(8)
=
(
αy1 αy2
0 αx2
) (
β ′1y β
′
1x
0 β ′2x
)
=
(
αy1β
′
1y αy1β
′
1x + αy2β
′
2x
0 αx2β
′
2x
)
,
where the 2 blocks of columns in α and β have full rank equal to r1, r2, and
r = r1 + r2. Hence
• the ECM terms in the autonomous VAR system for xt are αx2β
′
2xxt,
while the ones that appear in the VARX subsystem for yt are αy1β
′
1wwt+
αy2β
′
2xxt;
7See, e.g., (Marimon and Sunder, 1993), and Bernasconi and Kirchkamp, 2000 for a
more recent study.
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• the CI rank of the autonomous VAR system xt is equal to r2;
• under Assumptions 3 αy1β
′
1y has a block-diagonal structure of the form
αy1 = diag(α11, . . . , αmm), βy1 = diag(β11, . . . , βmm).
Proof. Mosconi and Giannini (1992) prove (8), see also Johansen (1995),
section 5.6. Note that we exclude I(2) behaviour. Under Assumptions 3 one
has that Πyy = diag(Π11, . . . , Πmm), which can be decomposed into αy1β
′
1y
with block-diagonal structure of the form αy1 = diag(α11, . . . , αmm), βy1 =
diag(β11, . . . , βmm) where Πii = αiiβ
′
ii.
Proposition 8 clarifies that the analysis of the autonomous VAR for the
stimuli allows to make inference on part of the cointegrating space, the one
spanned by βx2. We observe that the structure of the restricted joint VAR
allows the expectation variables to possibly respond to the disequilibrium
errors β ′2xxt in any way, including the one characterising the ECM in the
field, with coefficients αx2. This behaviour would be consistent with rational
expectations.
The ECM of the expectation variables possibly contains r1 additional CI
vectors. One such CI vector could be of the form y1i,t−x
1
t , i.e. could describe
the expectation error. Adjustment to this expectation error is expected in
an adaptive scheme.
The comparison of the field and expectation sub-systems allows to eval-
uate the presence and direction of causality, both in the real-world data and
in their perception by the agents in the expectations data. Significant coef-
ficients on taxes within the equation for spending are taken as evidence of
causality from taxes to spending, and vice versa.
In the next section we illustrate in greater details the type of cointegrating
and causal relationships which may be expected between and within the two
models. We do it while summarising the various steps of the econometric
analysis performed on the data.
4 Empirical specification and inference
The econometric specification described in the previous sections allows to
perform the empirical analysis in two stages: the first one on the field sub-
system, the second one on the expectation data.
4.1 Specification of the field model (stimuli)
Visual inspection and evidence in the literature suggest that the stimuli data
xt := (Tt, Gt)
′ are integrated of order 1, I(1). Because xt contains the ratio
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of taxes and expenditure to total GDP, xt := (Tt, Gt)
′, we expect the system
xt not to contain a linear trend.
A natural parametrisation of the sub-system is then
∆xt = αx2(β
′
2xxt−1 + ρ) +
k−1∑
`=1
Γ`,xx∆xt−` + xt, (9)
where µx = αx2 · ρ has been assumed to exclude linear trends (see Johansen,
1995).
Versions of this basic model have been analysed quite extensively in the
empirical time series analysis on fiscal policy. Two issues have been con-
sidered with particular attention: the sustainability of fiscal policy and the
direction of causality between fiscal variables.
Since Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Hakio and Rush (1991), a classical
method to address the first issue investigates cointegration between taxes
and public expenditure inclusive of interest payments: in short, cointegra-
tion tests of sustainability are based on the idea that solvency requires the
budget deficit to be stationary8. We follow a standard procedure to test for
cointegration.
We start determining the lags order k of the field VAR: for each country,
we begin with k = 5 and then restrict the order eliminating lags which are not
statistical significant and checking for absence of correlation in the residuals.
The Johansen (1995) procedure is used to test for the rank r2 of the system,
and possibly to estimate the cointegrating vector β2x. We use the LR trace
test for H0 : r2 = 0 versus H1 : r2 = 1, and exclude the case of a stationary
system r2 = 2, where both taxes and expenditure are stationary in levels.
This assumption is justified by previous studies and informal inspection of
the graphs of the series; see figure 4 and 5 with stimulus data in Section 2.
We rely on standard n-asymptotic tables, despite the limited time span
of the data set. This reflects the unavailability of finite sample size quantiles,
and it is also consistent with the inference agents could possibly perform in
the experiment.
8Quintos (1995) clarifies that stationarity is in fact a strong solvency condition. In
particular, he shows that the No Ponzi Game on public deficits is satisfied when the budget
is integrated of order one and therefore distinguishes between strong and weak forms of
solvency (on this, see also Bergman, 2001). We also note that, empirically, it has been
proved difficult to accept sustainability in most countries (see references in Bohn, 1998,
for the US; and see, e.g., Manasse, 1996, and the results section below for international
evidence). Recently, Bohn (1998), and Sarno (2001) have adopted econometric approach
which allow for nonlinearity in the adjustment process of fiscal policy; and have reach
results supporting sustainability.
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For the countries for which r2 = 1, we estimate the CI vector in the form
β ′2xxt = Tt + γGt imposing the normalisation to 1 of the coefficient of taxes,
and testing whether the corresponding spending parameter γ = −1 . The
ML estimate γ̂ of γ is later used in the analysis of the lab sub-system9.
The second empirical issue analysed within equation (9) concerns the
direction of causality between taxes and public expenditure. This is also
a classical theme in public finance. We recall four basic hypotheses. The
first is that taxes cause spending; this has for example been advocated by
the Leviathan State writers (Buchanan, 1977; Buchanan and Wagner, 1978),
and as an implication of improvements in the technological capacity of rais-
ing revenues (Friedman, 1978). The opposite view that expenditure proceeds
taxes is rooted in the theory of fiscal illusion, dating back to the nineteenth
century ‘Italian School of Public Finance’ (Buchanan, 1960); it is also implied
by Barro’s models of exogenous public spending (Barro, 1974, 1979). Bidirec-
tional causality may follow when taxes and expenditure are simultaneously
determined according to the standard economic calculus of weighting the
marginal costs and the marginal benefits of public services (Musgrave, 1966;
Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Lack of causality may finally arise when taxes
and public expenditure are decided upon by distinct institutional authorities
(Hoover and Sheffrin, 1992).
Tests of the presence and direction of causality can be based on the field
sub-model (9). In particular, when the series in xt := (Tt, Gt)
′ are cointe-
grated, we know that at least one between Tt and Gt adjusts to disequilib-
rium with respect to the long run relation. The four cases above corresponds
to vector αx2 of the forms (0, ∗)
′, (∗, 0)′, (∗, ∗)′ and (0, 0)′ (with ∗ indicat-
ing a non-zero coefficient), and provide tests of Granger long-run causality.
Similarly short run-causality can be simply checked looking for significant
off-diagonal coefficients in the matrices Γ`,xx. Mixed results have been ob-
tained regarding causality, see, e.g. recently, Garcia and Henin (1999) and
Payne (1998).
Again here, we emphasise that in the present paper we are not interested
in testing for causality (or for sustainability of fiscal policy) per se; but we
are interested in whether and how properties of fiscal policy found in the
stimuli are perceived in the lab-subsystems of expectations variables.
9Note that the generated regressor bias has no effect on the n-asymptotics for the
lab sub-system, because γ̂ is superconsistent, γ̂ − γ = Op(n
−1) compared to the n1/2
consistency of the parameters of stationary variables.
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4.2 Specification of the lab model (expectations)
Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the lab sub-system can be decomposed into
m individual sub-systems of the form
∆yi,t = µi+αi1β
′
1zi
(
yi,t−1
xt−1
)
+αi2(β
′
2xxt−1)+
k−1∑
`=1
(Γ`,ii : Γ`,ix)
(
∆yi,t−`
∆xt−`
)
+yt,
(10)
where yi,t := (T
Ei
t , G
Ei
t )
′ in the Tt and Gt treatment or yi,t := T
Ei
t in the
Tt only treatment, and xt := (Tt, Gt)
′. In the following we illustrate the
inference procedure only for yi,t := (T
Ei
t , G
Ei
t )
′, with obvious modifications
for the Tt only treatment. Equation (10) shows how the expectation variables
may react to the field disequilibrium error β ′2xxt−1, which is labelled ECMTG.
Additional CI relations may exist through the term αi1β
′
1zi
which is a 2× 4
matrix of rank r1i ≤ 2.
Inference on the number of additional CI vectors r1i can be performed for
fixed values of the ECM term ECMTG obtained in the marginal field system
10.
In this paper we take a different and simpler approach. The hypothesis of
adaptive behaviour in the formation of expectation suggests to calculate the
expectation errors (T Eit − Tt, G
Ei
t − Gt)
′ as a possible choice of extra CI
relations β ′1zi(y
′
i,t−1, x
′
t−1)
′. Because these extra relations do not contain any
parameter to be estimated, it is simple to inspect the implied time-series of
the forecast errors in order to infer if they are stationary or I(1). This can
be done visually or through univariate unit root tests. Both the tests and
the graphical analysis11 suggest that the forecast errors are stationary.
This leads us to conclude that the sub-system (10) could be rewritten as
follows
(
∆T Eit
∆GEit
)
= µi +αi

 T Eit−1 − Tt−1GEit−1 −Gt−1
Tt−1 + γ̂Gt−1

+ k−1∑
`=1
(Γ`,ii : Γ`,ix)
(
∆yi,t−`
∆xt−`
)
+ ε̂yt,
(11)
where αi := (αi1 : αi2) is the adjustment coefficient, ε̂yt := εyt − αi2(γ̂ −
γ)Gt−1. Eq. (11) involves only stationary variables and delivers standard n
1/2
asymptotics for (µi, αi, Γ`,ii, Γ`,ix, Ωii) (see Johansen, 1995, chapter 13.5).
10Paruolo (2001) has derived the asymptotics of LR trace test for CI rank when some
CI relation are known. These results are not directly applicable here because the ECM
term ECMTG has been estimated in the field sub-system and because (10) is a sub-system.
11Both are not reported for brevity.
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The analysis of eq. (11) permits to discriminate among the different ex-
pectation formation processes detailed in Section 3.2. In particular, if subject
i has rational expectations, one would expect the equations for ∆yi,t to col-
lapse to the specification of the marginal system ∆xt. This can be checked
by testing if the coefficients of the variables that are present in (11) and not
in (9) are equal to zero.
Of specific interest is to investigate whether and how the long-run adjust-
ment in the conditional model αi2 relate to the one in the marginal model
αx2, since this coefficient indicates if agents perceive and adjust to the actual
cointegration characteristics in the data.
However if expectations are adaptive, one would expect only ∆x1t to enter
the equation for ∆y1i,t, where a superscript 1 indicates one stimulus variable
and the corresponding forecast. If other variables appear in the equation for
∆y1i,t, this is consistent with an augmented-adaptive scheme. Again this can
be tested via zero restrictions on coefficients.
Finally, questions of perceived causality between taxes and public ex-
penditure can be addressed by inspection of parameters in (11), which nest
causality links from xt−` and yi,t−` to yi,t. In particular the off-diagonal ele-
ments in the Γ`,ix matrices and the αi2 coefficients determine the direction of
causality from the field to the lab, while the off-diagonal elements in the Γ`,ii
matrices and the αi1 coefficients regulate the ones from the past expectations
on present expectations. Causal links in αs pertain adjustment to the long
run equilibrium and are termed ‘long run causality’ links, while the ones in
Γs are called ‘short run causality’ links.
The individual lab sub-systems (11) may be estimated one at the time
or jointly. Joint estimation under some homogeneity restrictions allows to
exploit the panel dimension of the data to increase efficiency. In the em-
pirical analysis we first of all assume all individual-specific parameters to be
equal across agents (µi, αi, Γ`,ii, Γ`,ix, Ωii) = (µ∗, α∗, Γ`,∗, Γ`,∗x, Ω∗∗), obtaining
the maximal reduction in the number of parameters. We estimate for each
country a model of a representative-agent’s expectations, which we compare
with the corresponding country field model. This comparison will primarily
focus on the expectations obtained from the experiment conducted under
the fiscal frame. Next we will compare results from different treatments,
including experiments conducted under the neutral frame. There we will
also reconsider the homogeneity condition imposed through the representa-
tive agent assumption and we will perform alternative estimations at more
disaggregated levels.
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5 Empirical evidence
5.1 Analysis on the level of countries
Cointegration in the field: The result of the cointegration analysis of the
stimulus data is given in table 3. We find that two lags (that is, models with
one lagged difference, the VAR order is k = 2) are enough to characterise the
dynamic structure of the series for most of the countries considered in the
experiments. For 9 countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and UK), we find that taxes and public expendi-
tures are cointegrated; for 6 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland and
Spain) we find that they are not. Among the former and consistently with
the general evidence reported in the literature (see, e.g. Manasse, 1996), we
found that the condition for stationarity of the budget γ̂ = −1 is rejected for
most countries. In fact, it is accepted only for Italy, somehow surprisingly
given that Italy is notoriously considered a country with very easy public
spending12.
Causality in the field and in the lab: Table 4 summarises the main
findings of the inference on both the field and the lab systems in the two
experimental treatments under the fiscal frame. The complete parameter
estimates are available in appendix A, other evidence on the estimates will
be provided below.
Parameters reported in the table 4 are significant at a 5% level at least13.
In considering the results, recall that in the Tt only treatment, in which
agents forecast taxes, expectations on GEit are not available. Thus, inference
results on the lab system for the Tt only treatment is limited to the equation
for ∆y1t = ∆T
Ei
t+1.
The first part of the table reports, for the field and for the lab, the
coefficients of responses to the field error correction term β ′2x(Tt, Gt)
′ (also
indicated with ECMTG). Consider first the field evidence (the first column in
the table). Among the nine countries for which cointegration between taxes
and expenditure was found, expenditure is long-run adjusting to taxes in four
cases (Austria, Norway, Sweden and UK); taxes are adjusting to expenditure
in others four (Finland, Germany, Italy and Netherlands); and in one country
(Portugal) there is bidirectional adjustment.
12Notice, however, that the hypothesis of no-cointegration for Italy was rejected only
marginally with a p-value of 0.09.
13All models presented below have been selected performing a computerised strategy,
which started to drop coefficients with higher p-values. We have checked that the selected
models are robust to alternative procedures
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Table 3: Results of cointegration analysis on stimulus data
Country VAR H0(r2 = 0) Rank Cointegrating Vector Test of the
(sample period) order versus (β ′2x, ρ) homogeneity
H1(r2 = 1) condition γ̂ = −1
Austria k = 3 42.5∗∗∗ r = 1 (1;−0.739;−10.385) −13.23∗∗∗
(1970-98)
Belgium k = 2 9.05 r = 0
(1970-98)
Denmark k = 2 15.92 r = 0
(1971-95)
Finland k = 5 27.99∗∗∗ r = 1 (1;−0.565;−21.436) −28.29∗∗∗
(1970-98)
France k = 2 15.92 r = 0
(1970-98)
Germany k = 2 19.40∗ r = 1 (1;−0.572;−17.863) −4.32∗∗
(1976-98)
Greece k = 2 14.37 r = 0
(1970-98)
Ireland k = 2 16.67 r = 0
(1970-98)
Italy k = 4 18.19∗ r = 1 (1;−0.892; 0) −1.72
(1970-98)
Netherlands k = 2 20.47∗∗ r = 1 (1;−0.606;−17.630) −13.51∗∗∗
(1970-98)
Norway k = 2 18.42∗ r = 1 (1;−1.051; 0) −3.52∗∗
(1970-98)
Portugal k = 3 49.12∗∗∗ r = 1 (1;−1.177; 13.667) −2.09∗
(1970-98)
Spain k = 2 16.10 r = 0
(1970-98)
Sweden k = 2 18.18∗ r = 1 (1 : −0.950; 0) −2.13∗
(1970-98)
UK k = 2 23.42∗∗ r = 1 (1;−0.922; 0) −9.18∗∗∗
(1970-98)
Legend: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote rejection at, in the order, 10%, 5%, 1% significance level.
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Vectors of responses to
ECMTG: Tt+γ̂Gt
Vectors of responses to
(ECMT
ET , ECMG
EG)′: β ′w1 · (yt−1, xt−1)
′
Direction of short run causality
inferred from Γl,xx and Γ`,ix
Field
αx2
Tt and Gt
treatment
αi2
Tt only
treatment
αi2
Tt and Gt
treatment
αi1
Tt only
treatment
αi1
Field
Tt and Gt
treatment
Tt only
treatment
Austria ( 0,1.308) ( 0,0) ( 0,*) ((-0.921,0), ( 0.084,-0.695)) ((-0.863,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ← G
Belgium ((-0.838,0), ( 0,-0.656)) ((-0.810,*) ,*) T ← G T ↔ G T ← G
Denmark ((-0.885,0.138), ( 0.096,-0.622)) ((-0.872,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ← G
Finland (-0.953,0) (-0.145,0) (-0.164,*) ((-0.923,0.171), ( 0,-0.512)) ((-0.825,*) ,*) T ← G T ↔ G T ← G
France ((-0.709,-0.124), ( 0,-0.849)) ((-0.655,*) ,*) T ← G T ↔ G T ← G
Germany (-1.007,0) ( 0,0) ( 0.165,*) ((-0.842,0), ( 0,-0.695)) ((-0.961,*) ,*) T → G T ← G
Greece ((-0.915,0), ( 0,-0.717)) ((-1.058,*) ,*) T ← G T ← G
Ireland ((-0.739,0), (-0.141,-0.799)) ((-0.676,*) ,*) T → G T ← G
Italy (-0.155,0) (-0.072,-0.084) (-0.034,*) ((-0.771,0.074), ( 0,-0.744)) ((-0.864,*) ,*) T → G
Netherlands (-0.623,0) ( 0,0) ( 0,*) ((-0.736,0), ( 0,-0.800)) ((-0.809,*) ,*) T ← G T ← G
Norway ( 0,0.308) ( 0,0.083) ( 0,*) ((-0.732,0), ( 0.166,-0.751)) ((-0.731,*) ,*) T → G T → G T ← G
Portugal ( 0.290,0.670) ( 0,0.175) ( 0,*) ((-0.744,0), ( 0.240,-0.633)) ((-0.758,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ↔ G T ← G
Spain ((-0.732,0), ( 0,-0.657)) ((-0.548,*) ,*) T → G T ← G
Sweden ( 0,0.280) (-0.034,0.086) ( 0,*) ((-0.692,0), ( 0.111,-0.743)) ((-0.670,*) ,*) T → G T ← G T ← G
United-Kingdom ( 0,0.435) ( 0,0) ( 0,*) ((-0.883,0), ( 0.175,-0.780)) ((-0.675,*) ,*) T → G T ← G
Table 4: Summary of inference results
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Results from the experiments show that subjects don’t perceive the CI
characteristics of the field data. In both experimental treatments the lab
responses αi2 to ECMTG are often not significantly different from zero and
even when they are, αi2 are in any case quite small
14
In the rightmost part of table 4 we show the results of tests on Granger
causality in the field as it can be inferred from inspection of the off-diagonal
coefficients of the matrix Γl,xx from equation 11, and compare them with tests
of perceived causality in the lab as inferred from the off-diagonal coefficients
of matrix Γ`,ix.
Here also results speak strongly against subjects correctly perceiving the
properties of field stimuli data. Field evidence in particular shows that in
eight countries, causality runs in neither direction15, in three countries causal-
ity runs from expenditure to taxes; in two countries it runs from taxes to
expenditure16; and in other two causality is bidirectional17.
Lab results are not consistent with the directions of causality in the field.
In the Tt and Gt treatment only in one case (Portugal) the causality matches
the causality from the field data18. In the Tt only treatment the causality
from the field is consistent with the one in the lab in six cases19 and not
consistent in the remaining nine.
Expectation schemes: The middle part of table 4 shows the estimates of
the vector αy1 describing how individuals react in the long run to errors in the
process of expectations forming β ′1zi(y
′
i,t−1, x
′
t−1)
′ = (T Eit − Tt−1, G
Ei
t −Gt−1)
′
(also denoted (ECMT
ET, ECMG
EG)′). The results supports the importance of
14In greater details, in the Tt and Gt treatment, in which subjects forecasted both taxes
and expenditure, we find that in 4 countries (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, UK) subjects
fail to perceive any long run adjustment; in one country (Finland), they perceive some
low adjustment of taxes to expenditure, in two (Norway and Portugal) of expenditure to
taxes, and in other two (Italy and Sweden) a bi-directional long run adjustment. In the
Tt only treatment, we don’t know how participants perceive the dynamics of the series
of public expenditure; on the other hand, we see that out of the six countries in which
adjustment in the field was from expenditure to taxes, only in the case of Finland and
Italy participants seem to perceive some small adjustment in the right direction, while for
Germany the coefficient of the long run adjustment has the wrong sign.
15The countries were causality in the field runs in neither direction in the are Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK.
16These countries are Norway and Sweden.
17Bidirectional causality is found in Austria and Portugal in the field data.
18For one country (Austria), subjects don’t perceive any causality in the Tt and Gt
treatment while we estimate a bidirectional causality in the field. For the remaining 14
countries we estimate a causality with the lab data which is matched by the field causality
only in the case of Portugal.
19These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal.
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adaptive expectations. In the Tt and Gt treatment we find the coefficients for
ECMT
ET in the equation for ∆T Eit , and the coefficients on ECMG
EG in the
equation for ∆GEit to be positive and close to 1. The same holds in the Tt
only treatment for the coefficients for ECMT
ET in the equation for ∆T Eit
20 We
also see that in both experimental treatments the estimated parameters are
typically less than 1. (This is also confirmed by formal t-tests conducted on
the parameters). Conversely, we should note that in the Tt and Gt treatment,
the off-diagonal diagonal of αi1 are in most cases equal to or very close to
zero. In other words, subjects do not adjust expectations for taxes to errors
in the expectations on expenditure, and vice versa.
Taken as a whole, the aggregate evidence from table 4 thus indicates
that subjects are far from a model of rational expectations; their behaviour
seems rather to follow adaptive expectations, but possibly not quite a purely
adaptive model. While the results suggest that participants assume some
causality, this causality changes over countries. (As we will see this causal-
ity differs also among participants and, for each participant, it differs even
from country to country). We take this to be a weak evidence for model of
augmented-adaptive expectations.
To obtain further evidence on the issue, in figure 7 we compare the distri-
butions of the coefficients for the two fiscal treatments summarised in table
4 with similar aggregate estimates obtained from the experiments conducted
under the neutral frame. The left column of diagrams figure 7 shows esti-
mated coefficients for ∆T Eit , the right column of diagrams shows the coeffi-
cients for ∆GEit . We see some difference among treatments, but also a good
deal of similarity.
Coefficients of responses to the field error correction term ECMTG are zero
or close to zero for all treatments and for both equations for ∆T Eit and ∆G
Ei
t .
The distributions of the adjustment coefficients to the error terms
(ECMT
ET, ECMG
EG)′) confirm that in all treatments subjects follow in the
aggregate a model of adaptive expectation, with on-diagonal coefficients close
but generally lower than one, while off-diagonal coefficients are basically zero.
That is, subjects don’t adjust adaptively across variables. There is, however,
a small but clear difference between the treatments, in particular regarding
the equation for ∆GEit , for which subjects in the (control) neutral treatment
show greater adjustment coefficients than subjects in the fiscal (Tt and Gt)
treatment. One could say that the economic context reduces the amount of
adaptive behaviour.
The next graphs of the figure report the distribution of the coefficients
20In the Tt only treatment subjects do not form expectations on G, hence, we can not
measure the other coefficients.
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Figure 7: Results of estimating equation (11) for each country
Graphs show the distribution of the estimated coefficients of equation (11). We impose
the restriction that all individuals in one of our three treatments use the same model. The
distribution in the T +G treatment is always shown as a solid line, the distribution in the
T treatment as a dashed line, and the distribution in the neutral treatment is shown as a
dotted line. Distributions of coefficients for ECMT , ∆T , and ∆T
E are shown as thin lines,
distributions of coefficients for ECMG, ∆G, and ∆G
E are shown as thick lines.
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of matrices Γ`,ix summed over lags
21. In both equations, the diagonal coeffi-
cients (hence the own-effects of ∆Tt−` on ∆T
Ei
t and of ∆Gt−` on ∆G
Ei
t ) are
larger than the off-diagonal terms, which corroborates the view that percep-
tion of Granger causality in the Tt and Gt treatment is neither systematic
nor strong. A noteworthy exception is perceived causality from expenditure
to taxes in Tt only treatment which is often significant and positive, which
we view as support to include short run causalities for this treatment in table
4.
The last two diagrams show the coefficients from matrix Γ`,ii, summed-up
over lags, which refer to the short run effects of past expectations on present
expectations. The results show a moderate tendency of subjects smoothing
out peaks in past expectations, as these (diagonal) effects are negative, but
generally close to zero.
5.2 Analysis on the level of individuals
The results discussed in section 5.1 have been estimated assuming all
individual-specific parameters to be equal across agents within each coun-
try. This restriction may be natural when all individual behaviour satisfies
rational expectations. In the discussion of the estimates on the level of coun-
tries we have seen that subjects in aggregate violate rational expectations.
Still, there may be some subjects behaving differently or more rational than
others. In addition, it is possible that responses given by the same par-
ticipants for different countries are correlated. In such a case, correlated
responses by few participants may influence the patterns of aggregate results
(since the sample sizes of participants in the various treatments are in any
case limited).
To investigate this possibility we have also estimated equation (11) sep-
arately for each individual in each country. The results are shown in figure
8. The results do not alter the general picture from the homogeneous case
(figure 7). Rather, the results confirm the strong inclination toward adap-
tive expectations of most subjects, as well some other features of the data
presented for the aggregate case.
In figure 9 we show for the various treatments the cumulative distribu-
tions of the coefficients of the lab sub-systems (11) assuming that they are
equal for each participant over all countries (though they may differ among
participants)22.
21Looking at sums of coefficients to aggregate coefficients for different lags is crude, but
it is also simple and effective. We get a very similar picture if we take only the first lag.
The other lags are typically much smaller (by a factor of at least 10).
22We should note that there may be other ways to impose a structure on individual
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Figure 8: Results of estimating equation (11) separately for each individual
and each country
Graphs show the distribution of the estimated coefficients of equation (11). Individuals
may use different models for each country. The distribution in the T + G treatment is
always shown as a solid line, the distribution in the T treatment as a dashed line, and the
distribution in the neutral treatment is shown as a dotted line. Distributions of coefficients
for ECMT , ∆T , and ∆T
E are shown as thin lines, distributions of coefficients for ECMG,
∆G, and ∆GE are shown as thick lines.
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Figure 9: Results of estimating equation (11) for each individual
Graphs show the distribution of the estimated coefficients of equation (11). We impose
the restriction that each individual uses the same model for all countries. The distribution
in the T +G treatment is always shown as a solid line, the distribution in the T treatment
as a dashed line, and the distribution in the neutral treatment is shown as a dotted line.
Distributions of coefficients for ECMT , ∆T , and ∆T
E are shown as thin lines, distributions
of coefficients for ECMG, ∆G, and ∆G
E are shown as thick lines.
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The graphs look similar to those obtained for the coefficients estimated
in the representative agent set-up, with the few differences among the treat-
ments. In particular, the response estimates to vectors (ECMT
ET, ECMG
EG)′)
confirm that the (own) adjustments coefficients are grater than 0.5 and less
than 1 for most subjects in all treatments. They also verify, though, that
the coefficients in the neutral treatments are systematically greater than in
the fiscal treatments, and here also in the equation for expected taxes. The
data also confirm the general weak evidence on Granger causality from the
off-diagonal elements of matrix Γ`,ix, but less so in results from the Tt only
treatment.
5.3 Misspecification tests for nonlinearity and anti-
Keynesian effects
The VAR approach pursued in the previous sections works under the main-
tained hypothesis of a linear process for the time series considered. As in-
tuition and some current literature has documented (see Bohn, 1998, and
Sarno, 2001), this hypothesis may conflict with the fact that fiscal policy is
subject to various possible structural shifts and discretionary interventions,
which may introduce nonlinearity in fiscal policy.
We have controlled for misspecification biases due to nonlinearity in the
field systems by way of standard RESET tests. We haven’t found evidence
of misspecification for the spans of data given as stimulus to subjects in the
experiment.
When the field systems are correctly specified, still, the conduct of fiscal
policy might change at some point in time. As emphasised by some recent
literature a large intervention on the fiscal variables, perhaps addressed to
correct disequilibrium in the public budget, may be perceived by the public
as to imply lower taxation in the future, and therefore generate an expansion
in economic activity, rather than a contraction as predicted by a standard
Keynesian perspective.
Proposed originally by the Sachversta¨ndigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 1981, this view has been made popular
by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), who brought to the attention of the profes-
sion the astonishing expansionary fiscal consolidations occurred in the mid
1980s in Denmark and Ireland. Various subsequent literature has been de-
veloped on the circumstances and conditions under which nonlinear effects
of fiscal policy are more or less likely to occur.
behaviour over different countries. In this exercise we are keeping the structure of equation
(11) to facilitate the comparison with our previous results.
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Taking a pragmatic approach on the issue,
Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000) have defined periods of ‘large
and persistent’ fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions as situations in
which, for at least two consecutive years, the budget balance as a percentage
of GDP increase or decrease, respectively, by at least 1.5 point per year.
Looking at two panels of OECD and non-OECD data, the study reports
widespread evidence of nonlinear effects of fiscal policy.
However, as noted in the introduction, a problem with this approach is
that a link between the observed nonlinear effects of fiscal policy and the role
of expectations can be inferred, but not really tested.
We control for the possibility of nonlinear effects in the present exper-
iment introducing dummies in the equation (11) for expected taxes. Two
dummies are introduced on the intercept: one (dCONTR) activated in periods
of “sizeable and persistent” fiscal contractions, and the other (dEXP) acti-
vated in periods of “sizeable and persistent” fiscal expansions. According to
the view, we should expect the coefficients on dCONTR to be negative and
that on dEXP to be positive
23.
Table 5 reports the periods in which the two dummies were activated,
with the related evidence. (A fuller account of the evidence can be found in
appendix A).
We counted 11 episodes of fiscal expansions (in 10 countries, with Sweden
counting for two), and 10 episodes of fiscal contractions (in 7 countries, with
Ireland counting for two and Sweden for three). In the majority of cases the
dummies are not significant, in some they are inconsistent with theory. The
evidence thus rejects the hypothesis of nonlinear responses of expectations
to ‘large and persistent’ changes in fiscal policy per se.
6 Conclusion
In a famous taxonomy of the goal which may be pursued in the laboratory,
Roth (1987) suggests three categories to classify experiments in economics:
the first is “speaking to theorists”, the second is “searching for facts and
meaning”, the third is “whispering in the ears of princes”. The experiment
described in the previous pages has especially pursued the second goal in
a field — that of expectations on fiscal policy —, in which very little is
actually known, though much is assumed through the hypothesis of rational
expectations.
23This would in particular signal a negative and positive change in the drift of agents’
expectations following periods of “large and persistent” fiscal contraction and fiscal ex-
pansion, respectively.
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Vectors of responses to
ECMTG: Tt+γ̂Gt
Vectors of responses to
(ECMT
ET , ECMG
EG)′: β ′w1 · (yt−1, xt−1)
′
Direction of short run causality
inferred from Γl,xx and Γ`,ix
Fiscal Expansions
coefficients of dEXP
Fiscal Contractions
coefficients of dCONTR
Tt and Gt
treatment
αi2
Tt only
treatment
αi2
Tt and Gt
treatment
αi1
Tt only
treatment
αi1
Tt and Gt
treatment
Tt only
treatment
Episodes
Tt and Gt
treatment
Tt only
treatment
Episodes
Tt and Gt
treatment
Tt only
treatment
Austria ( 0,0) ( 0,*) ((-0.921,0), ( 0.084,-0.695)) ((-0.863,*) ,*) T ← G
Belgium ((-0.838,0), ( 0,-0.656)) ((-0.780,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ← G 80, 81 0 -0.303
Denmark ((-0.885,0.138), ( 0.096,-0.622)) ((-0.872,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ← G
74, 75, 80,
81, 82
0 0
83, 84, 85,
86
0 0
Finland (-0.238,0) (-0.164,*) ((-0.932,0.210), ( 0,-0.512)) ((-0.825,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ← G 91, 92, 93 0.623 0
75, 76, 88,
89
0 0
France ((-0.712,0), ( 0,-0.849)) ((-0.655,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ← G 92, 93 0.466 0
Germany ( 0,0) ( 0.165,*) ((-0.842,0), ( 0,-0.695)) ((-0.961,*) ,*) T → G T ← G 74, 75 0 0
Greece ((-0.915,-0.067), ( 0,-0.717)) ((-1.058,*) ,*) T ← G 88, 89, 90 0 0 96, 97 0 0
Ireland ((-0.739,0), (-0.141,-0.799)) ((-0.676,*) ,*) T → G T ← G
74, 75, 78,
79, 80
0 0
83, 84, 87,
88
0 0
Italy (-0.072,-0.084) (-0.034,*) ((-0.771,0.074), ( 0,-0.744)) ((-0.864,*) ,*) T → G 71, 72 0 0
Netherlands ( 0,0) ( 0,*) ((-0.736,0), ( 0,-0.800)) ((-0.809,*) ,*) T ← G T ← G
Norway ( 0,0.083) ( 0,*) ((-0.736,0), ( 0.166,-0.751)) ((-0.731,*) ,*) T → G T ← G 91, 92 0.324 0 94, 95, 96 0 0
Portugal ( 0,0.175) ( 0,*) ((-0.744,0), ( 0.240,-0.633)) ((-0.758,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ← G 74, 75, 76 0 0
Spain ((-0.712,0), ( 0,-0.657)) ((-0.548,*) ,*) T ↔ G T ← G 81, 82 0 0 96, 97 0.312 0
Sweden (-0.034,0.086) ( 0,*) ((-0.715,0), ( 0.111,-0.743)) ((-0.673,*) ,*) T ← G
78, 79, 91,
92, 93
0.575 0
83, 84, 86,
87, 94, 95,
96
0 0.238
United-Kingdom ( 0,0) ( 0,*) ((-0.883,0), ( 0.175,-0.780)) ((-0.897,*) ,*) T → G
72, 73, 92,
93
0 0.791
Table 5: Evidence on expectations in episodes of “large and persistent” fiscal adjustments
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We attempt to take a first step in studying the reliability of this hypothesis
and the process people use to form expectations on fiscal variables more
generally. It is clear that in the real world expectations on fiscal policy
depend on a long list of political, institutional, and cultural conditions. Yet,
we have conducted an experiment in which participants receive as stimuli
only real world data on fiscal variables and where they form expectations
on the basis of that information alone. We have taken this approach to
control the environment of the stimulus data as the very essence of laboratory
experiments.
Though such a simple environment is not the most precise model of a
process of fiscal expectations, in providing only a limited set of information,
and in leaving out announcements, contracts between countries, etc., we
want come close in the experiment to standard models used by economists
and econometricians to study and analyse the properties of fiscal policy.
Consistently, we follow an econometric approach for the process of formation
of expectations, which coherently arises from the data generating process
of the field stimuli; we have distinguished between long-run and short-run
effects, both of the stimuli and of past expectations.
We found that subjects behave adaptively, though they do not adjust
perfectly to past expectation errors, not even in the long run. We found that
subjects follow an augmented-adaptive model, which hasn’t however revealed
a general pattern of behaviour regarding causal relationships between fiscal
variables. Indeed, we have found little difference in the models estimated
for subjects giving expectations when they knew that the stimulus data con-
cerned real fiscal variables, and the control group which didn’t know. Still,
we have seen less noise and more accuracy in the expectations of participants
in the fiscal frame than in the neutral frame, which we have taken as a sign of
a better understanding of the experimental task and of the internal validity
of the experimental set-up.
For subjects in the fiscal frame, we have also tested whether their expec-
tations respond nonlinearly to large discretionary changes in fiscal policy;
but we haven’t found this behaviour. Once again, this does not necessarily
mean that nonlinear effects of fiscal policy may not be relevant in the field,
however, it means that if nonlinear effects occur, they might not be simply
imputed to general characteristics of fiscal policy per se, but may need other
catalysing factors, which may be political events, announcements, perhaps
news from the press or media broadcasting.
A possible next step would be to include some of these factors in a richer
experimental setup, which gives information on political events or announce-
ments from historical records, as additional stimulus data. Likewise, experi-
ments giving more information on the country or the period of stimulus data
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or the composition of the public budget may provide a way to test models of
an increasing degree of closeness to the real world, while maintaining control
on subjects’ information sets.
From a methodological perspective, the main novelty of the present ap-
proach is the idea of using field and laboratory data complementarily. Exper-
imental economics has grown substantially over the last two or three decades,
as it is now a well-acknowledged method through which decision theorists,
game theorists and microeconomists have tested and refined theoretical mod-
els in their respective fields of interest.
Relatively few experiments have instead been conducted in the field of
macroeconomics. The reason, probably, is that macroeconomists deal with
real world questions to a much greater degree than other economists, in
the belief that laboratory experiments cannot really answer such type of
questions. Olivier Blanchard argues in this context: “When an engineer
wants to find out how the temperature affects material’s conductivity, she
builds an experiment in which she changes the temperature, makes sure that
everything else remains the same, and looks at the change in conductivity.
But macroeconomists who want to find out, for example, how changes in
the money supply affect aggregate activity cannot perform such controlled
experiments; they cannot make the world stop while they ask the central
bank to change the money supply” (Blanchard, 1997).
The approach pursued in this paper suggests that it is not necessary to
make the whole world stop to test macroeconomic models experimentally.
Instead, by using real world data as stimulus for subjects in the experiments
it may be possible to start collecting pieces of evidence that may help us
understanding which forces and variables are more relevant when individuals
take macroeconomic actions.
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A Detailed results of the estimation
without dummies with dummies for contr. and exp.
field Tt and Gt Tt only neutral Tt and Gt Tt only neutral
∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G
Austria
ECM · 1.31 · · · · · · · · · ·
ECMT · · -.921 .084 -.863 -.89 .155 -.921 .084 -.863 -.89 .155
∆T Et−1 · · · · -.06 · -.115 · · -.06 · -.115
∆Tt−1 -.562 -.751 .275 · .247 .411 · .275 · .247 .411 ·
ECMG · · · -.695 · · -.94 · -.695 · · -.94
∆GEt−1 · · · -.07 · · · · -.07 · · ·
∆Gt−1 · .355 · .713 .225 · .77 · .713 .225 · .77
∆Gt−2 .318 .705 · · · · · · · · · ·
Belgium
ECMT · · -.838 · -.81 -.77 .097 -.838 · -.78 -.752 .097
∆T Et−1 · · -.085 · -.067 -.1 · -.085 · -.081 -.119 ·
∆T Et−2 · · -.056 · -.052 -.094 · -.056 · -.06 -.1 ·
∆Tt−1 · · .43 -.139 .33 .602 · .43 -.139 .313 .546 ·
ECMG · · · -.656 · .095 -.673 · -.656 · .095 -.673
∆GEt−1 · · · -.067 · -.063 -.105 · -.067 · -.052 -.105
∆Gt−1 .261 .372 .096 .874 .217 .205 .884 .096 .874 .264 .268 .884
dEXP · · · · · · · · · -.303 -.422 ·
Denmark
ECMT · · -.885 .096 -.872 -.647 .342 -.885 .212 -.872 -.647 .297
∆T Et−1 · · -.057 -.087 · -.121 -.294 -.057 -.162 · -.121 -.279
∆T Et−2 · · · · · · -.105 · -.062 · · -.076
∆Tt−1 · · .456 · .386 .865 .265 .456 .328 .386 .569 .587
ECMG · · .138 -.622 · · -1 .138 -.691 · · -.949
∆GEt−1 · · -.066 -.146 · -.037 · -.066 -.121 · · -.063
∆GEt−2 · · · -.062 · .048 · · · · .035 ·
∆Gt−1 · · .175 .933 .128 .058 .721 .175 .757 .128 .246 .517
dEXP · · · · · · · · · · -.993 .784
dCONTR · · · · · · · · -.605 · .92 -1.43
Finland
continued on next page
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without dummies with dummies for contr. and exp.
field Tt and Gt Tt only neutral Tt and Gt Tt only neutral
∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G
ECM -.953 · -.145 · -.164 · · -.238 · -.164 · -.216
ECMT · · -.923 · -.825 -.935 · -.932 · -.825 -.935 ·
∆T Et−1 · · · · · · .12 · · · · .124
∆T Et−2 · · · · · · .133 · · · · .148
∆Tt−1 .847 · .486 · .55 .514 · .627 .18 .55 .514 ·
∆Tt−2 .514 · · · · · · .13 · · · ·
∆Tt−3 · · · · · · · .139 · · · ·
∆Tt−4 .528 · · -.252 · · · · -.267 · · ·
ECMG · · .171 -.512 · · -.879 .21 -.573 · · -.894
∆GEt−1 · · · -.079 · · · -.057 · · · ·
∆Gt−1 · .872 .067 .943 .097 · .538 · .791 .097 · .653
∆Gt−2 -.666 -.468 · · · · · · · · · ·
∆Gt−3 · · -.101 · · · · -.177 · · · ·
∆Gt−4 -.309 · · · · · -.168 · · · · -.199
dEXP · · · · · · · .623 · · · -1.24
dCONTR · · · · · · · · · · · .889
France
ECMT · · -.709 · -.655 -.902 -.212 -.712 · -.655 -.901 -.198
∆T Et−2 · · · .125 · .08 .068 · .092 · · ·
∆Tt−1 · · .432 · .501 .421 -.252 .493 · .501 .608 ·
ECMG · · -.124 -.849 · · -.859 · -.817 · · -.869
∆GEt−1 · · -.052 -.116 · · · -.108 -.138 · · ·
∆GEt−2 · · .056 · · · · · · · · ·
∆Gt−1 .358 .444 · .527 .172 .092 .545 · .435 .172 -.188 .243
dEXP · · · · · · · .466 .506 · .829 .771
Germany
ECM -1.01 · · · .165 · · · · .165 · ·
ECMT · · -.842 · -.961 -.853 · -.842 · -.961 -.853 ·
∆T Et−2 · · · -.14 · · · · -.14 · · ·
∆Tt−1 · · .398 -.234 · .516 · .398 -.234 · .516 ·
ECMG · · · -.695 · · -.939 · -.695 · · -.939
∆Gt−1 · · · .709 .3 · .459 · .709 .3 · .459
Greece
ECMT · · -.915 · -1.06 -1.05 .191 -.915 · -1.06 -.757 .191
∆T Et−1 · · · · -.118 · · · · -.118 -.228 ·
∆T Et−2 · · · · -.106 · · · · -.106 -.143 ·
∆Tt−1 · · .275 · · .128 · .283 · · .317 ·
ECMG · · · -.717 · · -1.14 -.067 -.717 · · -1.14
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without dummies with dummies for contr. and exp.
field Tt and Gt Tt only neutral Tt and Gt Tt only neutral
∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G
∆GEt−1 · · · -.109 · · · · -.109 · · ·
∆GEt−2 · · · -.078 · · · · -.078 · · ·
∆Gt−1 · · .09 .601 .122 · .134 · .601 .122 · .134
dEXP · · · · · · · · · · -.944 ·
Ireland
ECMT · · -.739 -.141 -.676 -.849 · -.739 · -.676 -.836 ·
∆T Et−1 · · · · -.097 · · · · -.097 · ·
∆Tt−1 · · .54 -.183 .345 .512 -.132 .54 · .345 .671 ·
ECMG · · · -.799 · .112 -.886 · -.813 · .111 -.881
∆GEt−2 · · · · · .047 · · · · .06 .065
∆Gt−1 · · · .329 .158 .193 .309 · .25 .158 .202 .272
dEXP · · · · · · · · · · -1.55 -1.76
dCONTR · · · · · · · · -1.42 · -.845 -1.95
Italy
ECM -.155 · -.072 -.084 -.034 · · -.072 -.084 -.034 · ·
ECMT · · -.771 · -.864 -.651 .197 -.771 · -.864 -.651 .197
∆T Et−1 · · -.223 · · -.22 -.207 -.223 · · -.22 -.207
∆T Et−2 · · -.088 · · -.158 · -.088 · · -.158 ·
∆Tt−1 · · .573 -.237 .441 .574 · .573 -.237 .441 .574 ·
∆Tt−2 · · .324 · · · .203 .324 · · · .203
ECMG · · .074 -.744 · · -.764 .074 -.744 · · -.764
∆GEt−1 · · · -.112 · · · · -.112 · · ·
∆GEt−2 · · · -.062 · · · · -.062 · · ·
∆Gt−1 · · · .543 · · .593 · .543 · · .593
∆Gt−2 · · · · · .164 · · · · .164 ·
∆Gt−3 · .587 · · · · · · · · · ·
Netherlands
ECM -.622 · · · · .303 · · · · .303 ·
ECMT · · -.736 · -.809 -.14 .341 -.736 · -.809 -.14 .341
∆T Et−1 · · -.146 · -.123 -.426 -.143 -.146 · -.123 -.426 -.143
∆T Et−2 · · -.049 · · -.121 · -.049 · · -.121 ·
∆Tt−1 · · .376 · .306 1.05 .404 .376 · .306 1.05 .404
ECMG · · · -.8 · · -.761 · -.8 · · -.761
∆GEt−1 · · .071 · · .147 · .071 · · .147 ·
∆GEt−2 · · .073 · · .069 · .073 · · .069 ·
∆Gt−1 .368 .478 · .501 .174 · .598 · .501 .174 · .598
Norway
ECM · .308 · .083 · · · · .083 · · .093
continued on next page
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without dummies with dummies for contr. and exp.
field Tt and Gt Tt only neutral Tt and Gt Tt only neutral
∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G
ECMT · · -.732 .166 -.731 -.728 .34 -.736 .166 -.731 -.797 .391
∆T Et−1 · · -.08 -.162 · -.06 -.153 -.073 -.162 · · -.221
∆T Et−2 · · -.056 -.147 · · -.108 -.055 -.147 · · -.163
∆Tt−1 · -.461 .431 · .407 .557 .303 .453 · .407 .54 .296
ECMG · · · -.751 · .119 -.705 · -.751 · .126 -.727
∆GEt−1 · · · -.14 · · -.205 · -.14 · · -.173
∆GEt−2 · · · · · · -.125 · · · · -.094
∆Gt−1 · .489 · .549 .156 .105 .661 · .549 .156 .102 .626
dEXP · · · · · · · .324 · · .449 .725
Portugal
ECM .288 .666 · .175 · · · · .175 · · ·
ECMT · · -.744 .24 -.758 -.753 · -.744 .24 -.758 -.753 ·
∆T Et−1 · · -.098 · -.18 -.131 · -.098 · -.18 -.131 ·
∆Tt−1 · -.591 .402 .433 .409 .701 .456 .402 .433 .409 .701 .456
∆Tt−2 -.436 -.481 · · .168 · · · · .168 · ·
ECMG · · · -.633 · · -1.11 · -.633 · · -1.11
∆GEt−1 · · · -.171 · · · · -.171 · · ·
∆GEt−2 · · · · · -.032 · · · · -.032 ·
∆Gt−1 .297 .375 .124 .267 .08 .055 -.3 .124 .267 .08 .055 -.3
∆Gt−2 .168 .374 .064 · · · -.22 .064 · · · -.22
Spain
ECMT · · -.732 · -.548 -.572 .165 -.712 · -.548 -.572 .187
∆T Et−1 · · -.077 -.099 -.18 -.205 -.162 -.096 -.099 -.18 -.205 -.128
∆T Et−2 · · · -.093 -.078 -.078 -.09 · -.093 -.078 -.078 ·
∆Tt−1 · · .716 · .704 .825 · .724 · .704 .825 ·
ECMG · · · -.657 · .107 -.524 · -.657 · .107 -.559
∆GEt−1 · · · · · · -.152 .039 · · · -.132
∆GEt−2 · · · · · · -.079 · · · · -.06
∆Gt−1 · · · .706 .197 .19 1.06 · .706 .197 .19 1.07
dCONTR · · · · · · · .312 · · · .767
Sweden
ECM · .276 -.034 .086 · -.03 .093 -.034 .086 · -.03 .087
ECMT · · -.692 .111 -.67 -.808 · -.715 .111 -.673 -.808 ·
∆T Et−1 · · -.099 · -.086 -.116 · -.076 · -.076 -.116 ·
∆Tt−1 · -.553 .553 · .573 .515 -.091 .573 · .564 .515 -.151
ECMG · · · -.743 · · -.881 · -.743 · · -.878
∆GEt−1 · · · -.094 · · · · -.094 · · ·
∆GEt−2 · · · · · -.029 · · · · -.029 ·
continued on next page
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without dummies with dummies for contr. and exp.
field Tt and Gt Tt only neutral Tt and Gt Tt only neutral
∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆T ∆G
∆Gt−1 · .423 .063 .701 .104 · .654 · .701 .139 · .716
dEXP · · · · · · · .575 · · · -.67
dCONTR · · · · · · · · · .238 · ·
United-Kingdom
ECM · .435 · · · · · · · · · ·
ECMT · · -.883 .175 -.675 -.942 -.21 -.883 .175 -.897 -.942 -.21
∆T Et−1 · · · -.085 -.159 · · · -.085 · · ·
∆T Et−2 · · · · -.076 · .08 · · · · .08
∆Tt−1 · · .284 .19 .618 .429 -.23 .284 .19 .507 .429 -.23
ECMG · · · -.78 · · -.699 · -.78 · · -.699
∆GEt−1 · · · · · · -.146 · · · · -.146
∆Gt−1 · .385 · .467 .139 · .86 · .467 · · .86
dEXP · · · · · · · · · .791 · ·
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B Instructions to the experiment
The experiment was conducted in German. In this section you find a trans-
lation of the instructions:
1. Please read the instructions carefully. Only if you have understood
them well you can successfully participate in the experiment and gain
money.
2. Thereafter fill in the questionnaire at the screen.
Welcome to the strategy experiment
Welcome to the strategy experiment
This strategy experiment is financed by the University of Mannheim and
the German research council.
The instructions are simple, and if you carefully pay attention to it and
decide deliberately, you will win a considerable amount of money, which is
disbursed to you at the end of the game.
The payment is dependent on your success. In the experiment you fore-
cast the development of public expenditures and taxation in several European
countries. For that purpose there are past data about budget debt, annual
change of budget debt, government expenditure and taxes made available for
you. Dependent on the quality of your forecast you receive a payment for
each period.
Please note that we do not have any interest in paying less money than
you are entitled to. We must return all the money, which we do not disburse
to you, to the German research council.
Please note that we will not deceive you in this experiment. Everything
you read in these instructions is correct. You may take this for granted, but
actually there are occasionally experiments in psychology, where experiment
participants are deceived about parts of the experiment. This is not the case
in economic experiments like this. In the beginning we explain exactly the
rules to you, and we will also adhere to them.
Rules
You will play several rounds in turns. In each round it is your task to forecast
the development of two variables. These variables refer to the development of
government expenditure and taxes in several European states between 1950
and 2000. Which states you play in each case will be specified randomly and
is not made known to you. These data are shown graphically.
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Top of the screen
On the left you can see the development of the budget debt and annual
change of budget debt, each in per cent of the gross national product. The
horizontal axis shows time in years. You may use this data to obtain a
reference point how government expenditure and taxes will change in the
future. Current periods are shown in black, past periods are shown in gray.
On the right you can see the government expenditure and taxes, again
as percentage share of the gross national product. The vertical axis shows
government expenditure, the horizontal axis shows taxes. Government ex-
penditure is higher than taxes above the red diagonal; below, government
expenditure is lower than taxes. Past periods are shown in a lighter shade of
gray than current periods.
Partial representation of the past development You can present your-
self also only one part of the past periods to get a better overview.
In order to do so click on the diagrams budget debt and annual change
of budget debt. In these diagrams the range to the right of your click is
covered black. Also in the diagram of government expenditure and taxes
the covered periods are not shown. Each click onto the black range of the
diagrams budget debt and annual change of budget debt uncovers one period
after another. A click on the blue range uncovers all periods.
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Forecasts In order to make a forecast about the development of govern-
ment expenditure and taxes, click onto the white range. Your forecast is
shown in blue.
If you are content with your forecast, please confirm it by clicking on
confirm forecast . If you want to correct your forecast, please click on
delete forecast .
Payment Given your forecast the computer determines a consumption de-
cision, which would be optimal for a person who lives in the period. From
your consumption-decisions you derive a certain utility. This utility is com-
pared with the utility you would have obtained if you had forecasted the true
future development of taxes and government expenditure.
You receive a wage of 0.45¤ per minute for a correct forecast. Worse
forecasts result in smaller wages.
It is worth to spend some time to make a good forecast. Example: You
need 2 minutes in order to make a very good forecast and therefore receive
wages of 0.45¤ per minute. Your income in the 2 minutes is thus 0.90¤.
Another person, who makes forecasts for e.g. 4 periods in these 2 minutes,
which are not so good, may only receive a wage of 0.10¤ per minute for each
forecast. The income of this person in the 2 minutes is thus only 0.20¤.
You should settle your forecast within 2 minutes. If you need more time
for a forecast, you are paid only for the first 2 minutes.
A warning on the left side will remind you, as soon as you need more
than 2 minutes.
Furthermore you get a list about the income of your past forecasts on the
left side.
Duration of the experiment The experiment takes 90 minutes, regard-
less whether you made many or few forecasts in this time. That requires,
however, that you take yourself at least 20 seconds time for each forecast
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on the average. If you take yourself less time, you are finished with the
experiment sooner, but earn fewer money, accordingly.
Should you have any questions, you now have the opportunity to ask
them. In addition, you can ask questions at any time during the experiment.
Appendix to the instructions
To determine your payoff we use the following model. It is not necessary
to understand this model to participate successfully in the experi-
ment. The model is shown only in case you want to control us.
In two subsequent periods you consume c0 and c1 and pay taxes t0, t1.
You save the remaining part:
si = 1− ci − ti (12)
Your total income in each period is Y = 1 (note that all values are relative
to the gross domestic product Y ).
We call government expenditure gi. Then your utility in two subsequent
periods is
u =
1∑
i=0
γci + (1− γ)gi (13)
In your case γ = 0.75.
Your budget restriction is
1∑
i=0
si · (1 + r)
i = 0 (14)
with an interest rate r = 0.1.
Based on your forecast for t1 and g1 we determine your optimal consump-
tion c0.
In the next period t1 und g1 are realised. Your actual consumption c1,
and, hence, your utility u, follows from the budget restriction. This utility is
compared with the utility u∗ that you could have obtained with the correct
forecast for t1 and g1. Your wage is (u/u
∗)η. In your case η = 12000. This
normalisation does not change your utility maximisation problem.
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